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The Role of Accounting in the Financial Crisis: Lessons for the Future
       Good evening. It is truly an honor to be invited to give this lecture, considering the pantheon of speakers who
have preceded me and I hope I live up to your expectations.
       What I want to do is talk a little about the financial crisis that some might say we have gone through already;
some might say that we are still going through, and some might say that something worse is yet to come. Wherever
you stand, I think we would all agree that we had a financial crisis and we would like to know whether accounting
played a role in it. I am certainly not going to say that it was all because of accounting–far from it–there were many
reasons why we experienced what we did. My hope is that I can shed some light on the role that accounting played.

Then I would like to take you to thinking in terms of what are some of the lessons that we could learn from the
financial crisis.
Genesis of the crisis
       I am going to start with the genesis of the current crisis, meaning the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and some of that
history. As I go through that history, you might think, “what does that have to do with accounting?” But patience is
the word and very soon I will try to explain the link between accounting and the financial crisis. Once again, I want
to emphasize that when I say link, it does not mean the only reason why the financial crisis took place.
       In my opinion, the seeds of the 2008-2009 crisis were sown in the bad events that unfolded during 2000-2001.
First of all, the tech bubble burst. All of a sudden there was, if not a recession, at least a downturn. On top of that, we
had 9-11. I certainly don't have to talk about 9-11 in terms of how horrible that event was when we are here in New
York City. The combination of those two, the bursting of the tech bubble and 9-11, portended that a severe downturn
might be on the way.
       So recession was on the horizon, and the newly inaugurated Bush Administration started in January 2001 to take
some steps and, at the time, those steps seemed prudent. Most economists, I think, supported those steps. The new
administration, along with the Federal Reserve and its Chairman Alan Greenspan, the architect of the monetary
policy at the time, attempted to stave off the impending recession with a three-prong strategy. The strategy was first
and foremost to lower taxes. The second was to lower interest rates and to make credit more easily available to spur
economic growth. The third was to cheapen the currency. Some of that discussion, mind you, is taking place right
now as well, so in that sense, history repeats itself. I am not trying to make this into a political debate at all; at the
same time, the only point I want to make is that in early 2001, these three things seemed like really good ideas. As a
matter of evidence of what seemed to be good ideas, let's look at what happened subsequently.
       The three prong strategy – lower taxes, lower interest and easy credit, and cheaper dollars – seemed to work
miracles. It sure did. Unemployment was at a record low. The greatest impact of that strategy was to spur demand in
the housing sector. The housing sector started to do extremely well because easy credit made it possible for a lot of
U.S. individuals and families to purchase homes and, as a result, we started experiencing trickle down effects which
were not trivial. Once the housing sector started to do well, the construction industry employed a lot of workers and
the construction sector employees started to spend their incomes on other goods–consumption goods, retail goods,
consumer durables, as well retail products, and what we experienced was a tremendous amount of economic growth
which continued for several years. It wasn't for six months or one year; it continued well into 2006-2007. Only then
did we experience some signs that there might be some trouble down the road. But it took quite some time.
       Cheap dollar currency was quite helpful in spurring export-oriented growth and also in having a lot more tourists
visit to New York and other parts of the United States. As a result, the leisure and entertainment industry, the
hospitality industry, and the retail industry, benefited from the cheaper dollar, in addition to American exporters.
Once again, look at the discussion going on today in the marketplace. It's the same phenomena discussed in the
current environment.
       Bush, as well as Greenspan, won a lot of accolades in the marketplace for staving off a recession and making the
economy work beautifully for several years. Well, the party didn't last too long. Unfortunately, all those good things
had to come to an end. The strategy that seemed to work so beautifully, suddenly has us thinking that there were
some serious problems underneath. There were some cracks that were developing in the strategy. What were those
precisely? First and foremost, it was indeed the case that a huge number of people bought homes by borrowing
money from banks. The question is: Did all the home mortgage borrowers qualify for the mortgages? Did they really
qualify for the mortgages? Even though they borrowed money, did they have an income generating capacity to repay
those mortgages down the road, especially if interest rates were to rise? It seems at the time, when many of those
loans were no down payment and zero-interest type of loans, and the lending standards were relaxed dramatically,
that the impression was created that many qualified to borrow. But on a long-term basis, their ability to repay the
loan was rather limited. One would have thought that many of those borrowers wouldn't be able to repay those
mortgages over a reasonable time frame.

No Document Lending
       When you relax the lending standards to the extent that no documents are needed or, whatever documents are
supplied, no verification is needed, you can only imagine what would happen. At the time, I was in San Francisco
and I would like to tell you one story: There was a cleaning lady employed by my neighbor, and the cleaning lady
bought a home with an adjustable rate mortgage. When interest rates went up on the adjustable rate mortgage, she
had difficulty paying the mortgage. She asked the neighbor, who was in the financial services industry, what would
happen and what should she do. He said, “Well, walk away from that and buy another home.” And that's exactly
what she did. So at that time, credit was so easily available and, if you default, you could walk away from it without
having any bearing on your other assets. That clause in the mortgage and the law created some perverse incentives.
To some extent, we would miss that.
       So, no down payment, no employment verification, and interest only mortgages–all of these are recipes for
disaster in the sense that many people borrowed and, initially for a year or two or three, they didn't have any
problems. Things are moving along, and you would have all the trickle-down benefits, and all the more reason to
suspect that the strategy works very well and that you should only double down rather than cut down on those things
and that took place. What happened subsequently?
Securitizations
       Let us try to understand why lenders were willing to lend. We have to step back and ask, and it doesn't take
rocket science to figure out, that if you ask for no documents, no down payment, interest only loans, it's very risky.
So what were the lenders thinking? Why were they so eager to lend? There are a couple of factors. Again, none of
these things in its entirety explain the phenomena but together they have a lot to do with it. One of those was that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought securitized loan portfolios without asking questions.
       First of all, securitization, as we know from finance, is a very desirable phenomena, a very desirable financial
engineering invention that is helpful in spreading the risk. I'll always argue that securitization is good. So
securitization in itself is hardly the problem. In a well-functioning market, if you allow securitization, that would be
only helpful, and overall aggregate risk-bearing capacity in the economy and society will rise. You will have some
beneficial effects of securitization. But what was going on in this particular case, when there was a lending bank,
such as Countrywide, or Bank of America, that lent money to the borrower? They were able to turn around and say
that “these are the papers and this is the amount of money that we can lend,” and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
would buy them. They were not the only ones, but they were very large players in buying those mortgages from the
primary lenders.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
       As we know, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are quasi-government agencies. If they are buying these loans from
banks that means that the banks are only serving as intermediaries. They were not bearing any risk. As we know in
lending, there are three elements--loan origination, loan ownership and loan servicing. Loan ownership brings you
most of the risk. The origination function is completed after a loan is originated and you get some reward for
originating the loan. Loan servicing is the ongoing process, is keeping records and processing documents, and that's
not risky, but a fee-based oriented service and function. It is the loan ownership that is risky because there is the
chance that the borrower might default and therefore you might lose part of the principal. So it was loan ownership
that was being transferred in the securitization from the lending banks to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and some
others. Naturally that means the risk was being borne by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It was incumbent on them to
verify that the lending practices were sound. But once the lenders knew that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not
verifying whether or not the lender was following all the lending standards scrupulously, surely the lenders, or those
banks, were focusing only on the loan origination fees and servicing fees and not the paying attention to whether or
not the borrower qualified for the mortgage. As a result, lending standards were being compromised while banks
collected fees for their intermediary role.

       What were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac thinking? Why were they somewhat negligent or hugely negligent,
depending upon whom you ask? As quasi-government bodies, they were encouraged to do so by the Federal Reserve,
the Administration and by Congress. I would submit that, to a large extent, they were encouraged by Congress, then
the Administration, and then the Federal Reserve, in that order, if you will, in my opinion. The reason is pretty
straightforward and goes back to the 1990s-i.e., that over the years, it's an excellent social objective that we should
promote home ownership.
       There are several sound arguments as to what are the benefits of home ownership. People say that
neighborhoods are much better. When people have an ownership interest in a home, they maintain that property and
the neighborhood much better. Plus historically, home prices have risen quite substantially so home ownership and
saving, via home ownership, are good things for individuals to engage in. At the time of retirement, they would have
a good amount of savings as a result of home ownership. So there are several very desirable benefits of home
ownership and, therefore, home ownership has been encouraged for decades. But we might have gone too far in our
desire to stave off the recession. We thought that the route will go through home ownership and we did not pay
attention to the downside of promoting home ownership without paying attention to whether or not borrowers
qualified for those mortgages. So that was the genesis: home ownership and lending. The banks were happy to lend.
The Administration and Congress were keen on promoting home ownership so they were keen that we should
compromise some lending standards.
Accounting's Role
       Now, who else contributed to the problem? I think there were many cooks in this. It was a big job so nobody
could do this alone. There were several others. In my opinion, this is where accounting plays some of the role.
Accounting standards and accountants, CEOs, rating agencies and Wall Street were all accessory to the financial
crisis. How so? Think about securitization. Wall Street was interested in this because the securitization of loans
generated immediate profits. Whenever there is a buying and selling transaction that takes place, the intermediary
traders collect some fees, whether a bid-ask spread, a commission, or some other source of income. The trader's goal
is to maximize the amount of trading. Now imagine literally trillions of dollars of new securities available for
securitization. As a result, the amount of fee income was gigantic.
       As I said, some securitization is very desirable because it reallocates risk so you derive the benefit of
diversification. Not all of it is bad. It is just that too much of a good thing can be bad too. So that's what was going on
here. So what was different here? When many of the lenders sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, they might have
sold the entire mortgage. But when they securitize different tranches, there were different slivers of mortgages that
were sold piecemeal and, in many cases, including the bottom-most sliver. The level of these slivers reflects the
priority of collecting money from the borrower in the event of default. The highest level has the highest priority, and
all the way down. The lenders are in charge of verifying that the lending standards were followed carefully.
Traditionally, in the interest of imposing some level of risk on the lender, the lenders retained the riskiest sliver. But
somehow in the securitization process, the analysts and Wall Street thought that everything was AAA. Just sheer
diversification kind of lulled everyone into the thinking that all of these securitizations are AAA or very highly rated.
Hardly any of the securitized debt was rated less than that. This is inexplicable. How could everyone be so lulled-analysts, or Wall Street professionals, or even accountants and auditors?
       The reason auditors come into play is that banks were interested in not only laying off the risk but in recording
some gain, which is just not possible. If you lend money and you have some asset now, a loan receivable as an asset,
and you sell that, or even a portion of it, in the secondary market, that in itself cannot any generate any income
because income is earned over time as you collect interest. So the only reason you can generate some income is
because of the loan origination fee; that part you can generate. If all those slivers are fairly priced, then you should
not be able to generate any interest income because you are securitizing. But if you overestimate the safety of the
sold slivers, or underestimate the risk of the slivers you have retained, then because auditors and the corporation are
required to calculate the discounted present value, you have the potential to record an accounting income. That was
what was going on. So in many of the banks, the CEOs were saying, “In securitization, not only am I laying off the
risk, but I'm also reporting some income. Since it is accounting income, you qualify for a bonus. The amount of stock

options that are given to you are also increasing the amount of income that you receive.” So there were many people
who had a vested interest in securitization beyond for reasons other than risk reallocation. So that's what was going
on: The immediate gain was a big incentive to the banks and senior management to maximize the number and the
amount of mortgages, especially because you could sell them in the secondary market.
       Auditors seem to have turned a blind eye to the false information in loan applications and helped to compromise
lending standards in assessing the risk of the loans. Some of that litigation is now taking place. The primary role of
auditors is to verify whether the information that is supplied is accurate or not. If an employment record is missing,
it’s hard to imagine that the auditor can say, “This meets the conditions that underlie lending.” So in that sense, it is
difficult for me to imagine that, with the amount of lending that took place, and how it took place in certain parts of
the United States and the world, that auditors were diligent in verifying the information that was presented on those
loan applications.
Rating Agencies
       The same is true of the rating agencies. Most of the securitized loan tranches were AAA rated. Of all the people,
I find the role here of the rating agencies the most perplexing. I have looked at, in some other work as an expert
witness, how the rating agencies behave. Frequently, they are just following the stock price so they rate high or low
depending upon the stock price. Occasionally, there are some bold ones and we hear about them a fair bit, but most
of them are simply following. They are not colluding, I don't think, as there are 10, 20, 30 of them, and there are
tremendous incentives for them to be the first one and to be accurate. So here in rating these debts, either they didn't
quite fully understand or something else was going on. It is quite perplexing that so many of these securitizations
were rated so highly, especially given that it was well known who the borrowers were.
       One could justify the thinking of the rating on the basis that all these analysts thought that the stock market, and
especially the housing market, could go only up and that it has never discovered gravity. So, in that sense, that could
explain their AAA ratings. Rating agencies didn't carefully examine whether borrowers were in a position to repay
the loans, especially if you take into account the yield curve. Many of these were adjustable rate loans, and the yield
curve tells you what the expected future, or forward, rating, is likely to be, and therefore what is the expected
adjustment to the interest rate on those loans. To the extent that the payments could easily double or triple, I think it
is pretty clear that rating agencies should have factored that in, at least with some 10, 20, 30 percent probability that
there could be large scale loan defaults. To me at least, that is quite puzzling. In my opinion, and not just with
hindsight, the rating agencies grossly underestimated the default risk on all this lending that was taking place.
The Bubble Bursts
       So what triggered the bursting of this bubble in 2007 and 2008? Robust economic growth means that low
interest rates were no longer necessary. Interest rates are pro-cyclical in the sense that when the economy does well,
the short term rates start to rise, and when the economy is doing poorly, the interest rates are low. That's why, if you
look at the rates for the past couple of years, interest rates have been at record lows, not just here, but in Europe as
well. That's an indication that the economy hasn't quite yet gotten out of the recession, even though technically, it is
not in a recession, but it is not growly robustly either. But that was not the case in 2004-2005-2006. During that time,
when the economy was doing very well, interest rates rose like a phoenix. As I said, this rise in the rates was
predicted because of the yield curve. As they started rising, what we had very quickly was a spate of sub-prime
homeowners who quickly started to default. That default rate was dramatic. Their mortgage payments often times
doubled or tripled. Again, as I have said, there wasn't a lot of surprise there because one would have predicted, given
their income levels and the yield curve, that this was expected or likely to happen.
       The effects were rather dramatic. They were particularly severe in certain parts of the country. We can link it to
lending as otherwise it is difficult to understand why the financial crisis had so much more effect in California,
Nevada, and Florida. Internationally, which countries suffered the most? In England, there was a lot of lending that
took place. The problem was severe in California, Nevada and Florida because that's where sub-prime lending was
most prevalent. Just as construction led the way in the boom time, the severe stoppage in the construction industry

had a reverse trickle- down effect, if you will. As construction demand tanked, mortgage brokers and realtors were
hurting; banking services were hurting because of losses on the loans that they had retained, as well as a lack of
demand for their financial services. For goods and services, the retail, manufacturing and the service sectors started
to slow down, and job losses started to mount. One of the most dramatic rises in unemployment took place in the
period from 2008 and 2009; when unemployment rose from five percent to almost ten percent.
       The ripple effects are best characterized as a global tsunami, to use the cliché. Weaknesses in the economies of
those initially worse hit began to spread and led to more defaults and slowdowns. So now we are in a bad
equilibrium. Some people default, and because of their defaulting, there are some knockoff effects, and as a result of
that, an additional set of individuals start to default, and pricing in the neighborhoods get depressed, and that's what
we were experiencing. The banks started to suffer catastrophic losses from mortgage and loan defaults. Citigroup,
Bank of America and others had market caps of more than a $100 billion and all of that got wiped out virtually in a
matter of months; not to mention Bear Stearns and Morgan Stanley and some other firms. As a result, the stock
market dropped precipitously, as we well know. The international effects, as I have said, were quite visible.
Accounting's Role
       How did accounting play a role in this? There are two elements. One is the role of accounting standards.
Standards matter. The second is that you can have a set of standards, but how they are implemented, and what were
managers doing, and how did incentives contribute? As I have said, this is only part of the story. We are not talking
at this stage about what did Congress do, and what did other parties do. We are focusing somewhat narrowly on
accounting and the role that management might have played. Again, in my opinion, both of these factors contributed
to the crisis. There were other factors, perhaps more important, that were at play.
       I'm going to talk about financial information for a few well-known firms. It's very simple information that is
provided here. The key element is that accounting is about the past. Valuation is about the future. That tension has
been the source of many problems, especially when accounting has attempted to disguise itself as having something
to do with valuation, difficult in itself, and trying to provide some information in financial reports about the future.
Let us take a look at some of these things. Apple has 34,000 employees. Would you believe that their revenue per
employee is almost $1.9 million? Their market cap is 7.8 billion; their p/e ratio is 24 and market to book is 6.4. So
the market value is six times their book value, so naturally the market is expecting a lot of income in the future, and
continued growth. That's why the p/e ratio is so high as well. Microsoft, a giant today, but truly a super- giant in the
past, has 93,000 employees, their revenue per employee is $690,000; their market cap is $2 billion, their p/e ratio is a
modest 12, somewhat below the market average. Market to book is still pretty high, 4.7, but not in the stratosphere.
So what this means is that for Microsoft, unlike Apple, most of its glory has been in the past; even now it is a great
company in terms of generating income, a lot of revenue, but that kind of steep, upward sloping trajectory, at least in
the market's assessment, doesn't exist with a firm like Microsoft. HP is similar to Microsoft. Then there is Starbucks,
with 142,000 employees, $72,000 revenue per employee, and their p/e ratio is 26; market to book is almost six,
meaning thereby that a lot of growth is expected.
       What does this have to do with what we are talking about? The point is that accounting standards have a
potential to play a role because we have recognized that for high p/e ratio and high market to book firms, the value is
in anticipated revenues and profits and growth rate in both of those variables. So the implication is that in accounting
standards, we want to stay away from fair value type of accounting that would make it easier for firms to recognize
income by anticipating revenues and profits that are not yet earned. So to the extent that we try to masquerade
accounting as valuation, which means to try to anticipate future performance, we are likely to run into problems. One
is from standards but I will talk about incentives as well.
       On the other hand, we do want to continue with accounting standards that recognize losses on a timely basis. In
fair value accounting, we are relying on fair value, but on the lower of cost to market variety, meaning thereby on the
downside we think that accounting information provided by management is credible. We would like to require them
to report bad news so that if they fail to report that bad news we can hold them accountable ex post.
       It might become a little bit clearer, especially on the upside, why we want to be careful. Part of that is the role of

managerial incentives. Imagine that you have standards that allow you to record anticipated revenues or anticipated
income as income today. It would provide perverse incentives to management because you can increase market
value. You can increase it by reporting superior performance. And if you report superior performance by anticipating
future earnings, then all the more potential, whether it is real or not, because it would be judgmental to some extent.
In order to generate that future income, you actually have to work to deliver some effort in the future. But if you have
already anticipated that income, and report it as income today, you might get paid, and then there is no guarantee that
you would actually deliver the food needed to generate that future income.
       Going back to some of the lending that took place, when income was generated by merely lending some money
to borrowers and selling those mortgages in the secondary market, what was going on? Other than origination fees,
some of the future income was being recognized too soon, or some of the income that didn't exist was being
recognized because of underestimation of risk of the tranches of the debt that was sold versus the tranches of the debt
that was retained. Again, to the extent that standard accounting rules made it a little bit easier for managers to
recognize income that they hadn't earned yet, that created a situation that was ripe for misuse. From the stand point of
accounting standards, it would be wise to recognize that accounting standards should focus on what had happened,
rather than be in the business of anticipation. You could provide some of that anticipation in the Management
Discussion and Analysis section, or some other place, such as the analysts’ conferences, that management might
have.
       The other thing that managers might be keen on doing is to avoid a decline in the firm's market value.
Recognizing bad loans would have adverse effects on the stock price and it would have an adverse effect on the
amount of banking business that they do. So naturally, managers resist recognition of that bad news. Therefore,
accounting rules have to be such that they require them to recognize bad news. Still, they may not do that, but then
you have an avenue to litigate and hold them accountable for their actions after the fact at least.
       Finally, with all those things, still what it implies is that we certainly don't want to lose sight of the fact that
high-fee firms and high-market-to-book firms are the engines of growth. We can't sacrifice that engine of growth
because we don't know how to account for it. We have to devise ways around it. We have to promote economic
growth and yet accounting has to recognize that it has certain limitations. It also implies that, in addition to standards,
we have to have rigorous enforcement, sound auditing, and great vigilance.

